Justification of effort is a form of cognitive dissonance in which reinforcers are more valued when they are harder to obtain. Presumably, giving the reinforcer greater value justifies the greater effort needed to obtain it. But we have proposed that within-trial contrast between the end of the effort and the reinforcer (or signal for reinforcement) is responsible for this effect. We have found a similar effect in nonsocial tasks with adult humans and children. More important, we have found the effect in pigeons. Furthermore, the model predicts that any relatively aversive event can be used to enhance the value of the reinforcer that follows it. In support, we have found the effect when the prior event consists of more rather than less effort (pecking), a long rather than a short delay, and the absence of food rather than food. We have also found that a pigeon's preference for food at one location can shift to a different location if acquiring food at the new location requires that the pigeon work harder to obtain food at the new location. We have also found that the anticipation of a relatively more aversive event is sufficient to improve the value of a reinforcer that occurs on other trials. The within-trial contrast model may also provide a more parsimonious account of other social psychological phenomena such as, traditional cognitive dissonance effects, intrinsic versus extrinsic reinforcement effects, and learned industriousness effects. Keywords: Within-trial contrast, behavioral contrast, anticipatory contract, incentive contrast, delay reduction, justification of effort, cognitive dissonance Psychologists who study human behavior often posit underlying mechanisms that are difficult to measure directly. And because humans are known to be complex organisms with complex motivational systems, researchers studying human behavior may avoid asking if there are simpler accounts of the behavior being studied.
Psychologists who study human behavior often posit underlying mechanisms that are difficult to measure directly. And because humans are known to be complex organisms with complex motivational systems, researchers studying human behavior may avoid asking if there are simpler accounts of the behavior being studied.
One such example is the phenomenon known as transposition. This phenomenon is familiar to musicians who after playing a tune in one key can seamlessly transpose the tune to a different key with no apparent change in the melody (the relations among the notes). A similar effect can be shown in rats, when after training them on a simultaneous light-gray (S+) versus dark-gray (S-) discrimination with responding to the light-gray reinforced, rats are tested with the light-gray stimulus and a still lighter-gray stimulus (Sn). In spite of the fact that responding to the S+ had a history of reinforcement and responding to the Sn had not, rats typically choose the Sn over the S+. That is, it appears that they learned to choose the lighter one during training and they continued to choose the lighter one on test trials. That is, it appears that they had learned the relation between the two training stimuli rather than their absolute properties.
But Spence (1937) proposed that when organisms learn to respond to a stimulus for reinforcement, the tendency to respond generalizes to other similar stimuli (defining a gradient of stimulus generalization). Similarly, responding to the S-results in a gradient of inhibition around the value of the S-stimulus. According to Spence, it is the algebraic summation of those gradients at each point along the dimension that determines the strength of responding (the net response strength) at other points on the dimension (brightness in the example described). If one assumes that the gradients are convex (i.e., flatter near the training values) then the net gradient typically has its peak value not at the S+ but at a point away from the S+ in the direction away from the S-. This occurs because, given the presumed shape of the gradients, there would be a smaller decline in response strength as one begins to move away from the S+ than there would be a decline in inhibition at that point in the inhibitory gradient (see Spence, 1937) . In this way, paradoxically, Spence's theory of learning about the absolute properties of a stimulus can account for an animal's choice of a novel stimulus, never seen before, over the S+ training value, and hence it can account for transposition without appealing to relational learning.
Cognitive Dissonance
An even more striking example of a presumably complex human behavior that is likely to be influenced by simpler behavioral processes is the supposed human motivation to reduce cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance occurs when there is a discrepancy between one's beliefs and one's behavior. This can occur when one acts in a way that is inconsistent with the way one believes one should act. According to cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) , one should work to reduce the dissonance and if it is too late to avoid the behavior, one would modify one's beliefs to account for or justify one's behavior. Festinger and Carlsmith (1957) tested this theory by giving subjects a task considered to be boring and then asking them to tell a prospective subject that the task was interesting. In payment for this service, the experimenter would compensate them with a payment (the experimental manipulation) of either $1 or $20. But before carried out their assignment they were asked to fill out a questionnaire that included judgments about the task. Surprisingly, those subjects who were paid $1 judged the task to be more interesting than those who were paid $20. Festinger and Carlsmith explained the difference in terms of an attempt to reduce cognitive dissonance for the subjects paid only $1. For those subjects, the dissonance produced by having engaged in a boring task but having agreed to tell a potential subject that the task was interesting could not be resolved by appealing to the payment of $1. Instead, for those subjects the dissonance could be resolved only by altering their perception of the task (viewing it as more interesting than they originally thought it was). For the subjects who were paid $20, however, there was no dissonance because the payment of $20 was sufficient to resolve the dissonance (justify their behavior).
Justification of Effort
The complexity of the Festinger and Carlsmith (1957) study makes it difficult to study the phenomenon in nonverbal organisms but another version of cognitive dissonance, known as justification of effort, may be more amenable to study with laboratory animals (e.g., pigeons). Aronson and Mills (1959) had students undergo a "severe" or a "mild" initiation to join in a discussion group. Subjects in the severe initiation group were required to read a sexually explicit passage out loud in front of the experimenter, whereas those in the mild initiation group read a less embarrassing passage. When subjects were asked to evaluate the discussion group, those in the severe initiation condition rated it higher than those in the mild initiation group. Aronson and Mills interpreted their result in terms of cognitive dissonance. According to Aronson and Mills, to resolve the dissonance produced by reading the embarrassing passage, subjects in the severe initiation group gave more value to the discussion group than did subjects in the mild initiation group. In more general terms, the more difficult the task, the greater value is given to the reinforcers that follow task completion. For example, a student who received an A grade in organic chemistry will value that grade more than a similar A grade in physical education. Unfortunately, although the two grades may count equally towards the student's grade point average, there may be additional objective value for the A grade in organic chemistry (e.g., when attached to an application to medical school).
Similarly, although the discussion group offered to the subjects was the same for both groups, it is generally true that groups that are difficult to join are of higher value, so the assumption made by the subjects in the Aronson and Mills (1959) experiment may have been a reasonable 'rule of thumb.' The phenomenon of attributing added value to reinforcers depending on the effort that went into obtaining them could be studied in humans in a non-social context unconfounded by the subjects' prior experiences in joining groups. Klein, Bhatt, and Zentall (2005) conducted an experiment with a similar design but a simpler procedure than that used by Aronson and Mills (1959) . On a computer monitor, at the start of each trial, subjects were presented with a blue square. On half of the trials, a single mouse click on the square produced two abstract shapes (S1 and S2) and a single click to S1 was reinforced with "correct" (a response to S2 was followed by "incorrect"). On the remaining trials, a single mouse click was not sufficient to produce shapes. Instead, on those trials it required 20-30 clicks to produce a different pair of abstract shapes (S3 and S4) and a single click to S3 was reinforced with "correct" (a response to S4 was followed by "incorrect"). Then, on probe test trials with no feedback, when subjects were given a choice between the two positive shape stimuli (S1 and S3), they showed a preference for S3, the shape that in training required 20-30 clicks to produce. Furthermore, the preference for S3 did not depend on the number of clicks required on the test trials. That is, preference for S3 was found whether the test trial began with 1 click or 20-30 clicks.
A Simpler Procedure for Studying Justification of Effort
The results of the Klein et al (2005) experiment could be viewed as an example of cognitive dissonance reduction because subjects may have valued the positive stimulus (or conditioned reinforcer) that required greater effort over the positive stimulus that required less effort, presumably to justify the added effort required to obtain the reinforcer. However, it is more parsimonious to explain the result as a form of contrast which Klein et al. called within-trial contrast.
The Contrast Model: An Alternative to Justification of Effort
According to the contrast model, each trial starts at a relative value of zero (see Figure 1) . Further, the pecking requirement reduces the value below zero (20 pecks reduces the value more than 1peck). Reinforcement is assumed to have a positive effect on value relative to the start of the trial. Thus, the increase in value is assumed to be greater following an initial 20 pecks than following 1 peck and it is the increase in value at the time of reinforcement (or more specifically at the time of presentation of the positive shape, a conditioned reinforcer) that is assumed to give added value to the reinforcer. Figure 1 . The contrast model based on change in relative value, proposed to account for effects that would typically be explained in term of an effort to reduce cognitive dissonance or more specifically the justification of effort.
The interesting aspect of this model is it does not specify the nature of the event that results in negative value. Thus, according to this model, any relatively more aversive event should result in a preference for the discriminative stimulus that follows. Furthermore, if this effect is actually a form of contrast one also should be able to see it children and in other animals. Alessandri, Darcheville, and Zentall (in press) tested both of these predictions by using children and differential delay rather than differential responding. On one half of the trials, after responding to an initial stimulus the children immediately received a simple simultaneous discrimination. On the remaining trials, after responding to an initial stimulus the children experienced a 6 sec delay prior to receiving a different simple simultaneous discrimination. On test trials, when the children were given a choice between the two positive discriminative stimuli, they showed a significant preference for the positive stimulus that followed the delay in training.
Other Contrast Effects
Contrast effects of various kinds have been found in laboratory animals. To better characterized the kind of contrast considered in the present procedure I will briefly described the more conventional forms of contrast that have already been studied.
Incentive contrast. In incentive contrast, the magnitude of reinforcment that has been experienced for many trials, suddenly changes, and the change in behavior that follows is compared with the behavior of a comparison group that has experienced the final magnitude of reinforcement from the start. For example, Crespi (1942) found that rats trained to run for a large number of pellets and shifted to a small number of pellets, ran slower than rats trained to run for the smaller number of pellets from the start (negative incentive contrast). Conversely, rats trained to run for a small number of pellets and shifted to a large number of pellets ran faster than rats trained to run for the larger number of pellets from the start (positive incentive contrast).
Anticipatory contrast. Another form of contrast is anticipatory contrast. In anticipatory contrast, there are repeated (typically one a day) experiences with the shift in magnitude of reinforcement and the measure of contrast involves consummatory behavior that occurs prior to the anticipated change in reinforcement value. For example, rats often drink less of a weak saccharin solution if they have learned that it will be followed by a strong sucrose solution, relative to a control group for which the weak saccharin is followed by more of the weak saccharin (Flaherty, 1982) .
Behavioral contrast. A third form of contrast, behavioral contrast, involves the random alternation of two signaled outcomes. For example, pigeons are first trained on an operant task involving a multiple schedule of reinforcement. In a multiple schedule, two (or more) schedules, each signaled by a distinctive stimulus, are randomly alternated. Positive behavioral contrast can be demonstrated by training pigeons initially with equal probability of reinforcement schedules (e.g., two variable-interval 60-s schedules) and then reducing the probability of reinforcement in one schedule (e.g., from variable-interval 60-s to extinction) and noting an increase in the response rate in the other, unaltered schedule (Halliday & Boakes, 1971; Reynolds, 1963) .
Within-trial contrast. The contrast effect described in the present research is different from the three other forms of contrast already described. Whereas incentive contrast generally involves a single sudden shift in the magnitude of reinforcement within-trial contrast presumably involves many hundreds of shifts. As the dependent measure of anticipatory contrast involves the amount of consummation of a reinforcer it is quite different from the others but, in addition, the measure of importance occurs prior to the shift rather than after the shift as it does in the case of within-trial contrast. Finally, it is difficult to compare within-trial contrast to behavioral contrast because the better of the two schedules, which is generally the target schedule, is sandwiched between poorer schedules. However, Williams (1981) examined the effect of the poorer schedule prior to and following the richer schedule and concluded that behavioral contrast is attributable primarily to the higher rate of responding by pigeons in anticipation of the poorer schedule (anticipatory contrast), rather than in response to the appearance of the richer schedule (local contrast). Of all of the different forms of contrast, within-trial contrast appears to be most similar to the local contrast component of behavioral contrast.
Within-Trial Contrast Differential Response Requirement
If the results of the experiments with humans can be attributed to within-trial contrast, it would suggest that under similar conditions, one should be able to obtain similar results with pigeons. Clement, Feltus, Kaiser, and Zentall (2000) tested this hypothesis using key pecks rather than mouse clicks. During training, each of the two response requirements (high effort, 20 responses, and low effort, 1 response) were followed by a simple simultaneous discrimination (e.g., red positive, yellow negative or green positive, blue negative, respectively) that appeared on the left and right response keys. On test trials involving a choice between the two positive (S+) stimuli, the pigeons preferred the S+ that in training had been preceded by 20 pecks over the S+ that in training had been preceded by only 1 peck, and interestingly, although some of the test trials were preceded low effort, some by high effort, and some by no effort at all, the event that preceded the choice on test trials had little effect their preference for the S+ that followed greater effort in training (see Figure 2) . Figure 2 . Pigeons preferred the S+ and the S-that in training followed 20 pecks over the S+ and S-that followed 1 peck and the preference was independent of the response requirement on test trials; one peck (FR1), 20 pecks (FR20), or no response requirement (0). (After Clement Feltus, Kaiser, & Zentall, 2000) .
We also asked if pigeons would show a similar preference for a more direct measure of food preference: the location of food that followed greater effort over a different location of the same food that followed less effort . To answer this question, we conducted an experiment involving two feeders: one that provided food on trials in which 30 pecks were required to the center response key, the other that provided the same food on trials in which a single peck was required to the center response key.
On half of the training trials, one peck was required and the preferred feeder was raised. On the remaining trials, 30 pecks were required and the nonpreferred feed was raised. Over the course of training, we found that there was a significant increase in preference for the originally nonpreferred feeder (associated with the FR30 response). To ensure that the shift in feeder preference could not be attributed to extended training, we included a control group for which each of the two response requirements was followed equally often by each feeder. This group showed no systematic increase in preference for their nonpreferred feeder (see Figure 3) . Thus, it appears that the value of the location of food can be enhanced by being preceded by a high-effort response (as compared to a low-effort response). 
Delay to Reinforcement as an Aversive Event
If the interpretation of the within-trial contrast effect presented in Figure 1 is correct, then any prior event that is relatively aversive (compared with the alternative event on other trials) should result in a similar enhanced preference for the stimuli that follow. For example, given that pigeons generally prefer a shorter delay to reinforcement over a longer delay to reinforcement, according to this theory, they should also prefer discriminative stimuli that follow a longer delay over those that follow a shorter delay.
To test this hypothesis, we trained pigeons to peck the center response key (20 times on all trials) to produce a pair of discriminative stimuli (as in Clement et al., 2000) . On some trials, vertical lines were presented on the response key and pecking was followed immediately by one pair of discriminative stimuli (with no delay), whereas on the remaining trials, horizontal lines were presented on the response key and pecking was followed by a different pair of discriminative stimuli, but only after a delay of 6 sec (Figure 4) . On test trials, the pigeons were given a choice between the S+ stimuli and, as in the effortmanipulation experiments, they showed a significant preference for the S+ that in training had followed the delay. Once again, the experience of a relatively aversive event, a delay, produced an increase in the value of the positive discriminative stimulus that followed. Figure 4 . Design of experiment (and result of test trial choice) in which one pair of discriminative stimuli followed a signaled absence of delay and the other pair of discriminative stimuli followed a signaled delay (after DiGian, .
The Absence of Reinforcement as an Aversive Event
A related form of relatively aversive event is the absence of reinforcement in the context of reinforcement on other trials (Amsel, 1958) . If the within-trial contrast model is correct, reinforcement versus its absence prior to the appearance of the discriminative stimuli should result in a preference for discriminative stimuli that follow the absence of reinforcement. To test this hypothesis, pigeons were once again trained to peck a response key to produce a pair of discriminative stimuli. On some trials, vertical lines were presented on the response key and pecking was followed immediately by 2-sec access to food from the feeder and then immediately by the presentation of one pair of discriminative stimuli, whereas on the remaining trials, horizontal lines were presented on the response key and pecking was followed by the absence of food (for 2 sec) and then by the presentation of a different pair of discriminative stimuli (see Figure 5) . On test trials, the pigeons were given a choice between the S+ stimuli and once again, the experience of a relatively aversive event produced an increase in the value of the positive discriminative stimulus that followed (Friedrich, Clement, & Zentall, 2005) . Figure 5 . Design of experiment (and result of test trial choice) in which one pair of discriminative stimuli followed a signaled reinforcer and the other pair of discriminative stimuli followed a signaled reinforcer (after Friedrich, Clement, & Zentall, 2005) .
The Anticipation of Effort as the Aversive Event
One account of the added value that accrues to stimuli that follow greater effort is that during training, the greater effort expended produces a heightened state of arousal, and in that heightened state of arousal, the pigeons learn more about the discriminative stimuli that follow than about the discriminative stimuli that follow the lower state of arousal produced by lesser effort. If a heightened state of arousal leads to better learning about the discriminative stimuli that followed the more aversive event, one might expect faster or better learning of that discrimination; however, examination of the acquisition functions for the two simultaneous discriminations offers no support for this hypothesis. Over the various experiments that we have conducted, there has been no tendency for the simultaneous discrimination that followed greater effort, longer delays, or the absence of reinforcement, to have been acquired faster or to a higher level than the discrimination that followed less effort, shorter delays, or reinforcement. On the other hand, those discriminations were acquired very rapidly and we might have missed a small difference in the rate of discrimination acquisition sufficient to produce a preference for the S+ stimulus that followed the more aversive event.
Thus, we asked if anticipated effort that does not actually occur on the current trial could serve as the aversive event that increases the value of the conditioned reinforcer that follows. This experiment addressed the issue of whether the contrast between the initial aversive event and the conditioned reinforcer depends on actually experiencing the relatively aversive event. Could the possibility of having to make a high effort response give greater value to the appearance of the discriminative stimuli? Specifically, we asked if we could obtain a preference for the discriminative stimuli that followed a signal that more effort might be required, but actually was not required on that trial.
At the start of half of the training trials, pigeons were presented with a horizontal line on the center response key that signaled that a greater effort might later be required. On half of the horizontalline trials, pecking the horizontal line replaced it with a white key and 30 pecks to the white key resulted in reinforcement. On the remaining horizontal-line trials, pecking the horizontal line replaced it with a different simultaneous discrimination S+ FR30 S-FR30 on the left and right response keys and again choice of the S+ FR30 was reinforced. A schematic presentation of the design of this experiment appears in Figure 6 .
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Rf Rf Rf Rf Figure 6 . Design of experiment on the anticipation of contrast. On some trials signaled by vertical lines a single peck was required to obtain reinforcement, whereas on other trials signaled by the vertical lines there was a simultaneous discrimination and reinforcement followed choice of the S+. On some trials signaled by horizontal lines 20 pecks were required to obtain reinforcement whereas on other trials signaled by the horizontal lines there was a different simultaneous discrimination and reinforcement followed choice of the S+. On test trails involving a choice between the two S+ stimuli, pigeons preferred the S+ that in training had been signaled by the horizontal lines, the stimulus that on other trials signaled that 20 pecks would be required (after Clement & Zentall, 2002 , Experiment 1).
On the remaining training trials, the pigeons were presented with a vertical line on the center response key that signaled that a small effort later might be required. On half of the vertical-line trials, pecking the vertical line replaced it with a white key and a single peck to the white key resulted in reinforcement. On the remaining vertical-line trials, pecking the vertical line replaced it with a simultaneous discrimination S+ FR1 S-FR1 on the left and right response keys and choice of the S+ FR1 was reinforced. On test trials, when the pigeons were given a choice between S+ FR30 and S+ FR1 and, once again, they showed a significant preference for S+ FR30 . Thus, the expectation of differential effort, rather than actual differential effort, appears to be sufficient to produce a differential preference for the stimuli that follow.
In this experiment, it is important to note that the events that occurred in training on trials involving the two pairs of discriminative stimuli were essentially the same. It was only on the other half of the trials, those trials in which the discriminative stimuli did not appear that differential responding was required. These results extend the findings of the earlier research to include anticipated effort and rule out differential effort-producing arousal as the basis for within-trial contrast.
The Anticipation of the Absence of Reinforcement as the Aversive Event
If anticipated effort can function as a relative conditioned aversive event, can the absence of reinforcement serve the same function? Using a design similar to that used to examine differential anticipated effort we evaluated the effect of differential anticipated reinforcement (Clement & Zentall, 2002, Experiment 2) . A schematic presentation of the design of this experiment appears in Figure 7 . On test trials, consistent with the results of the earlier research, when the pigeons were given a choice between S+ Rf and S+ NRf , they showed a significant preference for S+ NRf . Thus, the anticipation of a possible aversive, absence-of-food event appears to produce a preference for the S+ that follows it; an effect that is similar to the anticipation of a high effort response.
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Rf S+L S-L NoRf S+H S-H Rf Rf Figure 7 . Design of experiment on the anticipation of contrast. On some trials signaled by vertical lines reinforcement followed, whereas on other trials signaled by the vertical lines there was a simultaneous discrimination and reinforcement followed choice of the S+. On some trials signaled by horizontal lines no reinforcement followed, whereas on other trials signaled by the horizontal lines there was a different simultaneous discrimination and reinforcement followed choice of the S+. On test trails involving a choice between the two S+ stimuli, pigeons preferred the S+ that in training had been signaled by the horizontal lines, the stimulus that on other trials signaled that no reinforcement would follow (after Clement & Zentall, 2002 , Experiment 2).
Contrast or Relative Delay Reduction?
To this point, I have described the stimulus (and location) preference in terms of a contrast effect. However, it is also possible to interpret this effect in terms of delay reduction theory (Fantino & Abarca, 1985) . According to delay reduction theory, a stimulus that predicts reinforcement sooner in its presence than in its absence will become a conditioned reinforcer. In the present experiments, the relation between the discriminative stimuli and the reinforcers should be the same. Thus, one could argue that the S+ stimuli do not differentially reduce the delay to reinforcement. But, according to the delay reduction hypothesis one should consider the predictive value of the discriminative stimuli relative to the total duration of the trial (see Figure 8 ). For example, in the case of the differential effort manipulation (Clement et al., 2000) , because it takes longer to produce 20 responses than to produce 1 response, 20-response trials would be longer than 1-response trials; and the appearance of the discriminative stimuli would occur relatively later in a 20-response trial than in a 1-response trial. The later in a trial that the discriminative stimuli appear, the closer would be their onset to reinforcement, relative to the start of the trial and thus, the greater relative reduction in delay that their appearance would represent. Figure 8 . Schematic of Delay Reduction Theory. When discriminative stimuli are presented relatively closer to reinforcement (following 20 pecks) they serve as a better predictor of reinforcement (they reduce the delay to reinforcement more) than when they follow one peck.
Using the same logic, a trial with a delay is longer than a trial without a delay (DiGian et al., 2004) . Thus, stimuli that appear after a delay should appear relatively later in the trial than stimuli that appear without a delay. The delay reduction hypothesis can also account for the effects of reinforcement versus the absence of reinforcement. In this case, the duration of trials with and without reinforcement is the same prior to the appearance of the discriminative stimuli. However, the delay reduction hypothesis considers the critical time to be the interval between reinforcements. Thus, on trials in which the discriminative stimuli are preceded by reinforcement, the time between reinforcements is short, so the discriminative stimuli should be associated with little reduction in delay to reinforcement. On trials in which the discriminative stimuli are preceded by the absence of reinforcement, however, the time between reinforcements is long (it is the time between reinforcement on the preceding trial and reinforcement on the current trial), so the discriminative stimuli on the current trial should be associated with a relatively large reduction in delay to reinforcement.
Results for Which Delay Reduction Theory Cannot Readily Account
The relative delay reduction hypothesis has a difficult time accounting for the effects of differential anticipated effort that does not actually occur (Clement & Zentall, 2002 , Experiment 1) because discriminative stimulus trials were not differentiated by number of responses, delay, or reinforcement. Thus, all trials with discriminative stimuli should have been of comparable duration. The same is true for the effects of differential anticipated reinforcement (Clement & Zentall, 2002 , Experiments 2 and 3) because that manipulation occurred on trials separate from the trials with the discriminative stimuli.
A Direct Test of Delay Reduction Theory
It should be possible to distinguish between the delay reduction and contrast accounts with the use of a design similar to that of Clement et al. (2000) . But instead of requiring that the pigeons peck many times on half of the trials and a few times on the remaining trials, one could use two schedules that accomplish the same result while holding the duration of the event constant (Singer, Berry, & Zentall, 2007) . This objective was accomplished by using a fixed interval schedule (FI, the first response after a fixed duration would present one pair of discriminative stimuli) on half of the trials and a differential reinforcement of other behavior schedule (DRO, the absence of key pecking for the same fixed duration would present the other pair of discriminative stimuli) on the remaining trials. According to the contrast account, the pigeons should prefer the positive stimulus that follows whichever of the two schedules is least preferred (schedule preference was assessed independently). According to the delay reduction hypothesis, if trial duration is held constant and the two pairs of discriminative stimuli occupy the same relative proportion of the two kinds of trial, the pigeons should not differentially prefer either positive stimulus. Singer et al. (2007) found that the pigeons showed idiosyncratic schedule preference. Several pigeons preferred the DRO schedule, whereas one pigeons preferred the FI schedule and several pigeons showed no consistent schedule preference. More important, whatever the schedule preference, the pigeons consistently preferred the positive stimulus that followed the less preferred schedule. Furthermore, there was a strong negative correlation between the degree of schedule preference and the degree of preference for the positive stimulus that followed.
Another approach to testing the delay reduction account would be to use the delay to reinforcement procedure used by DiGian et al. (2004) , but to manipulate where in the trial the delay occurs. For example, all trials would begin with the onset of a ready signal. On some trials, pecks to the ready signal would turn on the initial stimulus and pecks to the initial stimulus would initiate the delay followed by presentation of the discriminative stimuli. On the remaining trials, pecks to the ready signal would initiate the delay followed by the initial stimulus and pecks to the initial stimulus would be followed by presentation of the discriminative stimuli. Thus, the same delay would occur on all trials, however, on some trials the delay would occur after the initial stimulus whereas on other trials it would occur before the initial stimulus. According to the delay reduction hypothesis, as trial duration is held constant, there should be no difference in the relative delay reduction signaled by the discriminative stimuli. If, however, it is the aversiveness of the delay immediately prior to the onset of the discriminative stimuli that is responsible for the differential preference found in earlier research, the pigeons should prefer the S+ that immediately follows the delay, over the S+ that immediately follows the initial stimulus.
Implications for Social Psychological Phenomena
In the present article, the within-trial contrast hypothesis was proposed specifically as an alternative to the justification of effort hypothesis, a variant form of cognitive dissonance but the contrast account also may be applicable to other presumably complex social psychological phenomena.
The Classic Cognitive Dissonance Effect
As was noted earlier, the complexity of the cognitive dissonance experiment originally reported by Festinger and Carlsmith (1957) makes it difficult to study in nonverbal organisms but with a minor adjustment, the within-trial contrast model proposed in Figure 1 can account for that phenomenon as well. In this case, the dependent measure is the subjects' evaluation of the original task viewed from the perspective of having received either $1 or $20 (see Figure 9 ). According to the contrast account, when viewed from the relatively high value of $20, the task should appear to be of lower value than when viewed from the lower value of $1. Thus, the contrast account may provide a more parsimonious account this and other cognitive dissonance results. Figure 9 . Contrast model applied to cognitive dissonance experiment (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1957) . Subjects were given $1 or $20 to agree to tell another subject that a tedious task was interesting. When asked how interesting the task actually was, subjects given only $1 judged the task to be more interesting than those given $20.
Intrinsic versus Extrinsic Reinforcement
Contrast effects of the kind reported here may also be involved in the well-known capacity of extrinsic reinforcement to reduce intrinsic motivation (Deci, 1975 ; but see also Eisenberger & Cameron, 1996) . If there are activities that are intrinsically rewarding (e.g., puzzle solving), then providing extrinsic reinforcers for such activities may lead to a subsequent reduction in that behavior, especially when the extrinsic reinforcers are no longer provided. This effect has been interpreted as a shift in selfdetermination or locus of control (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Lepper, 1981) . But, such effects can also be viewed as examples of contrast. In this case, it is the contrast between extrinsic reinforcement and its sudden removal that may be responsible for the decline in performance (Flora, 1990) . Compare this result with Tinklepaugh's (1928) finding that monkeys that are switched from reinforcers of fruit (preferred) to lettuce (less preferred) often refuse to eat the lettuce in spite of the fact that the monkeys were quite willing to work for the lettuce reinforcer before being exposed to the fruit reinforcer.
Such contrast effects are likely to be different from those responsible for the results of the withintrial contrast experiments, however, because the removal of extrinsic reinforcement results in a change in actual reward value, relative to the reward value that is expected (i.e., the shift from a combination of both extrinsic and intrinsic reward to intrinsic reward alone). Thus, the effect of extrinsic reinforcement on intrinsic motivation is probably more similar to incentive contrast due to reward shifts of the kind reported by Crespi (1942, i.e ., rats run slower after they have been shifted from a large to a small magnitude of reward than rats that have always experienced the small magnitude of reward).
Learned Industriousness
Finally, contrast effects may also be involved in a somewhat different phenomenon that Eisenberger (1992) has called learned industriousness. If reinforcement is provided for performing a difficult (high effort) task, it may increase one's general readiness to expend effort on other goal-directed tasks. Eisenberger has attributed this effect to the conditioned reinforcer value of effort, a reasonable explanation for the phenomenon; but, contrast may also be involved.
The contrast explanation is as follows: In Eisenberger's (1992) design, if the original task is difficult and the second task is also difficult, there should be little contrast between the two tasks. However, if the original task is easy and the second task is difficult, there should be negative contrast between the originally easy task and the second, harder task and the negative contrast would be expected to result in a decrease in persistence.
Alternatively, if the original task easy and the second task is also easy, there should be little contrast between the two tasks. However, if the original task is difficult, and the second task is easy, there should be positive contrast between the originally difficult task and the later easy task. The positive contrast also would be expected to result in an increase in persistence. Thus, in either case, a contrast interpretation of the learned industriousness effect suggests that pretraining on a difficult task should result in better transfer than pretraining on an easy task regardless of the difficulty of the second task.
Conclusions About the Generality of Contrast Effects
From the previous discussion, it should be clear that contrast effects of the kind reported here in humans and pigeons (as well as the other forms of contrast: incentive contrast, anticipatory contrast, and behavioral contrast) may contribute to a number of experimental findings that have been reported with humans, but that traditionally have been explained using more complex cognitive and social accounts. Further examination of these phenomena from the perspective of simpler contrast effects may lead to more parsimonious explanations for what have previously been interpreted to be uniquely human phenomena.
Finally, our description of the various complex social phenomena as possible examples of contrast may give the mistaken impression that contrast effects are simple and are well understood. As prevalent as contrast effects appear to be, the mechanisms that account for them remain quite speculative. Consider the prevalence of the opposite effect, generalization or induction, in which experience in one context (or with one stimulus value) spreads to other contexts (or stimulus values) in direct proportion to their similarity (Hull, 1943) . According to a generalization account, generalization between values of reinforcement should tend to make the values more similar to each other, rather than more different. An important goal of future research should be to identify the conditions that produce contrast and differentiate them from those than produce generalization.
